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In this brief note I argue that putting conscious observers at the center of the considerations clar-
ifies and strengthens the many-worlds interpretation. The basic assumption, which seems extremely
plausible based on our current understanding of the brain and of decoherence, is that quantum
states corresponding to distinct conscious experiences have to be orthogonal. I show that, once
this is accepted, probabilistic measurement outcomes corresponding to basis elements and following
Born’s rule emerge naturally from global unitary dynamics.
Given the great success of quantum physics in the mi-
croscopic domain, it is very natural to wonder whether
it is universally valid, and in particular whether it can
account for our macroscopic experience. Arguing that it
can is the program of the “many worlds” interpretation
of quantum physics, which was first proposed by Everett
in 1957 [1] and developed by many others since then.
In this brief note I argue that it is very useful in the
context of this approach to put ourselves, i.e. conscious
observers, at the center of the considerations. This is
not only natural, since our ultimate goal is to explain
our experience of the world (which at first sight seems
to be in contradiction with the quantum description),
but also has considerable explanatory power, especially
when combined with our modern understanding of deco-
herence [2]. In particular, this approach helps to clarify
three points that are frequently raised in discussions of
“many worlds” [3, 4]. First, it explains why the results of
ideal measurements always correspond to bases in Hilbert
space, even though there is a continuum of possible quan-
tum states “between” the basis elements. Second, it ex-
plains why we experience definite outcomes even though
the global quantum state is a superposition of all possi-
bilities. Third, it also takes us a long way towards under-
standing why the probabilities of these definite outcomes
are given by the Born rule.
The reason why thinking about conscious observers
is useful in this context is the following. If we assume
for the sake of the argument that quantum physics ap-
plies to conscious beings, then it is extremely plausible
that quantum states that correspond to definite experi-
ences (e.g. the experience of observing “up” or “down” in
a Stern-Gerlach type experiment) are mutually orthogo-
nal. This is plausible because neuroscience shows already
quite convincingly that different states of conscious ex-
perience are associated with different patterns of neural
activity in the brain. Moreover the expected decoherence
times for superpositions of different firing patterns are ex-
tremely short compared to the characteristic timescales
of conscious experience [5]. It therefore seems safe to as-
sume that all the possible states of experience of a con-
scious subject form part of a basis. (Other elements of
the same basis correspond to the observer being uncon-
scious, or dead.)
This means that if |A1〉 and |A2〉 are two states of the
conscious subject, Alice, corresponding to two different
states of her conscious experience, let’s call them “experi-
ence 1” and “experience 2”, then 〈A1|A2〉 = 0. Moreover
the state α|A1〉+β|A2〉 (with α and β both different from
zero) does not correspond to any single conscious experi-
ence. Instead it corresponds, from Alice’s point of view,
to a superposition of two different “worlds”, one in which
she has experience 1, and one where she has experience
2. Note that another observer, Bob, may be perfectly
aware that Alice is in a superposition state. If he is tech-
nologically very powerful, he could perform the appropri-
ate quantum interference experiment to prove it. In the
course of such an experiment Alice would have to lose any
reliable memory of her previous experience (i.e. whether
it was experience 1 or experience 2). But there appears
to be no fundamental problem with such a scenario. In
particular her conscious experience does not constitute a
hidden variable with greater predictive power than the
quantum state. On the contrary, the quantum superpo-
sition state α|A1〉 + β|A2〉 tells the whole story about
her as a quantum system, whereas her experience (which
corresponds to |A1〉 or |A2〉, depending on her “world”)
does not. One could even imagine Bob telling Alice that
really she is in a superposition state. She would have to
reply, “This may be so, but based only on my subjective
experience there is no way for me to know.”
Let me now outline how this point of view helps to clar-
ify the many worlds approach. First, it explains why the
possible results of ideal measurements on a quantum sys-
tem always correspond to states in a certain orthogonal
basis. An ideal measurement of a quantum system in a
state |S1〉 should always give the same result (“state |S1〉
!”). By the definition of measurement, this result corre-
sponds to a definite experience for the observer. More
formally, we can write the dynamics as |S1〉|O0〉 → |O1〉,
where |O0〉 is the initial state of the observer, which also
includes her measurement apparatus, the air in the room
etc., and |O1〉 is the final state of the observer corre-
sponding to the conscious experience of having found the
measurement result “|S1〉 !”. Note that in our notation
the measured quantum system has become part of the
2extended observer state |O1〉 (if it was a photon, for ex-
ample, it may have been absorbed by a detector). There
is no assumption that the measurement can be repeated
with the same system [3].
Now suppose that the same measurement procedure,
when fed the system state |S2〉, always gives the def-
inite result “|S2〉 !”. This corresponds to a different
state of experience for the observer, which we denote
|O2〉, such that the dynamics of the measurement pro-
cess is now |S2〉|O0〉 → |O2〉. From our basic assump-
tion about states of conscious experience it follows that
〈O1|O2〉 = 0. If the overall dynamics is unitary, which
is of course assumed in the many worlds interpretation,
then the mappings |S1〉|O0〉 → |O1〉 and |S2〉|O0〉 → |O2〉
are compatible only if 〈S1|S2〉 = 0. Thus different possi-
ble results of an ideal measurement always correspond to
mutually orthogonal states for the system that is being
measured. The preceding argument is inspired by, but
different from, the argumentation in Ref. [3].
Second, there is now a plausible explanation for why
observers experience definite and probabilistic outcomes
in typical quantum measurements. If the quantum
system is originally in the state α|S1〉 + β|S2〉 (with
〈S1|S2〉 = 0), then, according to the above dynamics,
at the end of the measurement process we will have a
state |ψ〉 = α|O1〉 + β|O2〉. However, according to our
above arguments, only the states |O1〉 and |O2〉 corre-
spond to definite experiences. There is no single state of
experience corresponding to the superposition state. We
thus have to conclude that, from the point of view of the
observer, the state |ψ〉 is a superposition state of two dif-
ferent “worlds”. In one world, the observer experiences
outcome 1, in the other one outcome 2.
Since the observer always experiences definite out-
comes, she will, on repeating a given experiment, find
outcome 1 a certain number of times, outcome 2 a cer-
tain number of times etc. (in general there will be more
than two possible outcomes). The observer will therefore
be led to develop a probabilistic description. Can we un-
derstand, based only on the assumption of global unitary
dynamics, why the observer will be led to the Born rule?
I will now argue that, third, we can at least make a very
significant step in that direction [6].
The observer can of course measure the system in dif-
ferent (system) bases. Her goal is thus to assign probabil-
ities to all these different bases. But Gleason’s theorem
[7] tells us that there is only one way of assigning prob-
abilities to all elements of all bases in a consistent way,
namely to apply Born’s rule. In the given framework
of global unitary dynamics, Born’s rule is therefore the
only probability law that the observer’s experiments can
possibly lead her to.
There is one qualification to this statement. Gleason’s
theorem assumes that the probabilities are assigned in
a non-contextual way. That is, given a quantum state
|φ〉 which can be written as |φ〉 = α|1〉 + β|2〉 + γ|3〉
in the basis {|1〉, |2〉, |3〉}, and which can also be writ-
ten |φ〉 = α|1〉+ β′|2′〉+ γ′|3′〉, choosing a different basis
{|2′〉, |3′〉} in the subspace spanned by {|2〉, |3〉}, it is as-
sumed that the probability assigned to |1〉 for the state
|φ〉 does not depend on the choice of basis in the com-
plementary sub-space, i.e. it only depends on the coeffi-
cient α. It is interesting to note that standard quantum
physics, i.e. the Born rule, is non-contextual in assign-
ing probabilities, while non-contextual “hidden value” as-
signments are of course impossible [8].
Is it satisfactory to have non-contextuality of the prob-
ability assignment as an assumption? Phrased as above
(the probability only depends on the coefficient α) it cer-
tainly seems extremely natural. However, there may still
be room for a deeper understanding. I find the example
of decoherence encouraging in this respect. The deeper
physical understanding of its workings that was gained
since 1957 has strengthened the many-worlds interpreta-
tion very significantly. Maybe a similar further step will
eliminate all remaining doubts concerning the inevitabil-
ity of the Born rule in the many-worlds framework.
I have argued that the key features of our experience
(measurement results corresponding to bases, definite re-
sults occurring probabilistically, to a large extent also the
Born rule) emerge naturally in the many-worlds frame-
work if we place ourselves, i.e. conscious observers, at
the center of the consideration. Of course this does not
mean that quantum physics is universally valid. This
will be decided, and quite possibly proven not be the
case, by future experiments, see Ref. [9] for one such at-
tempt. However, I believe that the present considerations
strengthen the case for taking the many-worlds point of
view seriously, as possibly the most economical version
of quantum physics.
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